In 1995 , opium poppy crop surveys again showed a
substantial increase in cultivation within Afghanistan .
According to USG estimates , cultivation rose to 38,740
hectares , a 33 percent increase , 80 percent of this in newly
discovered areas of vegetation . Excluding the newly discovered
areas and Nangarhar Province ( where eradication was
undertaken) , the average increase in poppy cultivation was 24
percent . Production rose to an estimated 1,250 metric tons , a
32 percent increase , the second consecutive year of dramatic
increase . Afghan opium poppy cultivation has nearly doubled
since 1992 , and Afghanistan remains the second largest opium
producer in the world, after Burma .
The continuing civil war in Afghanistan among rival
factions has led to widespread lawlessness and dire economic
conditions for much of the country . In the absence of a
functioning government in Afghanistan , there is no bilateral
agreement on narcotics between Afghanistan and the
United States . In 1992 , the nominal government , which controls
less than 20 percent of the country , ratified the 1988 UN
Convention, but little visible progress has been made in
achieving its goals .
In Nangarhar province , a poppy eradication campaign , led by
Governor Haji Qadir , in late 1994 – early 1995 reduced poppy
cultivation by more than 22 percent . No evidence has been seen
of a similar campaign in the current growing season . In
October , Nangarhar opened an anti – drug center , combining drug
control and economic development functions . Several other
groups stated their opposition to narcotics production and
trafficking and requested U.S. counternarcotics assistance .
Despite this professed interest in counternarcotics
programs , there were no reports of efforts by any factions to
attempt to investigate , arrest or prosecute traffickers .
Reports further indicate that Afghan traffickers are processing
more of their own opium into heroin in- country , rather than
shipping raw opium to Pakistan for conversion .
Many local authorities condone both cultivation of opium
poppy and trafficking through their territory . Some officials
profit from the production and trafficking either directly or
indirectly .
The USG has a strong interest in helping Afghanistan
develop a broad- based national government that can address the
problems of narcotics , terrorism, and humanitarian concerns .
The USG supports the UN Special Mission to achieve this goal .
The USG also supports , subject to resource availability , the
programs of the UN agencies and non- governmental agencies aimed
at humanitarian relief , reconstruction , and counternarcotics .
Inasmuch as legislation makes special allowance for
continuation of such assistance generally and of assistance for
Afghanistan specifically , notwithstanding any other provision of
law , denying certification to Afghanistan would have minimal
effect in terms of implementation of this policy .
The continued growth in Afghan opium poppy cultivation,
which has trebled since 1990 , combined with the absence of
efforts to control trafficking , precludes a determination that
Afghanistan has taken adequate counternarcotics steps on its own
or that it has sufficiently cooperated with the USG and the UN
in counternarcotics efforts . Accordingly , denial of
certification is appropriate .